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406 Michigan Law Review 
Actual Expenses of Ohio Utility Are Considered in 
Computing Rates Even Though the Hypothetical 
Company Technique Is Used-General Tel. Co. 
v. Public Util. Comm'n 
[Vol. 63 
The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio1 established rates for 
plaintiff telephone company. In determining the gross annual reve-
nues to which the company was entitled, the Commission allowed, as 
an item of expense, 112 thousand dollars less for federal income tax 
than the company would actually be required to pay during the year 
in question. The allowance for taxes was calculated by following the 
so-called "hypothetical company" formula as apparently required by 
a recent line of Ohio Supreme Court decisions.2 On direct appeal 
to the Ohio Supreme Court, held, order reversed, two judges dissent-
ing. The utility company should be allowed to consider as an item of 
expense the federal income tax amount which it will actually have to 
pay, based upon its computed annual dollar return. Use of the "hypo-
thetical company" method in calculating the allowable expense for 
income tax is contrary to the law of Ohio because it results in an 
arbitrary reduction in the determined fair rate of return to the 
utility. General Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 174 Ohio St. 575, 
191 N.E.2d 341 (1963).3 
The Ohio Revised Code provides that the basic theory to be used 
by the Commission in fixing public utility rates is the "fair value" 
theory;4 that is, a utility is to be allowed a reasonable yearly return 
on the fair value of its property used for public service. The statute 
provides that the fair value of the utility's property for rate-making 
purposes shall be the cost of constructing new facilities identical to 
those in service, less depreciation.5 This reconstruction-cost-new-
less-depreciation (RCNLD) computation constitutes the statutory 
rate base in the utility rate-making process; and the yearly reason-
able dollar return on the property is computed by multiplying this 
statutory rate base by a percentage figure established by the Com-
I. Hereinafter called the Commission. 
2. Ohio Edison Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 173 Ohio St. 478, 184 N.E.2d 70 (1962); 
Cincinnati Gas&: Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 173 Ohio St. 473, 184 N.E.2d 84 
(1962); Ohio Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 171 Ohio St. 10, 167 N.E.2d 496 
(1960); City of Cleveland v. Public Util. Comm'n, 164 Ohio St. 442, 132 N.E.2d 216 
(1956). Apparently, Ohio is the only state which has adhered to the hypothetical 
company method of rate-making. This theory is explained in detail in the text ac-
companying notes 9-14 infra. 
3. Two companion cases presenting the identical issue were similarly decided, 
City of Dayton v. Public Util. Comm'n, 174 Ohio St. 604, 190 N.E.2d 913 (1963); Ohio 
Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 174 Ohio St. 585, 191 N.E.2d 347 (1963). 
4. OHIO R.Ev. CODE ANN. §§ 4909.04-.05, .15 (Page 1954). See note 10 infra, 
5. Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 4909.05 (Page 1954). 
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mission as representing a fair rate of return.6 To the resulting dollar 
amount are added all the operating expenses for the year (including 
the expense of federal income tax) in order to obtain the company's 
annual revenue requirement. Rates are then fixed to assure the com-
pany of collecting that amount.7 While this mathematical procedure 
is simple enough, the "fair value" approach frequently presents 
problems in practical application.8 The primary weakness of the 
method is that in times of inflation the rate base is higher than the 
book value, or actual amount invested in the company, and in times 
of depression the opposite will occur, thus rendering illusory a 
standardized concept of "fair return" on the property. 
In City of Cleveland v. Public Util. Comm'n,9 the court con-
strued the language of the Ohio statute10 as requiring that the dollar 
amount of the statutory rate base of any Ohio public utility be taken, 
for rate-making purposes, to represent an equal amount of capital 
invested in a hypothetical company. The hypothetical company was 
held entitled to earn on this amount a return reasonable in light of 
the projection of the actual company's debt-equity ratio upon the 
amount of the hypothetical company's capital. This method of rate-
making, accepted without serious objection11 until the decision in 
the principal case, is simply illustrated. Assume that actual invest-
6. City of Cleveland v. Public Util. Comm'n, 164 Ohio St. 442, 443, 132 N.E.2d 
216, 217 (1956). 
7. For example: 
Reconstruction cost new ••.•...................•.•.....• 
(minus) Existing depreciation •.................................. 
RCNLD ..........................•.........•..•......• 
(times) Annual fair rate of return .............•................ 
Annual dollar amount of return •...........•.••........ 
(plus) Annual operating expenses ......•............•....•..... 
Allowable gross annual revenues ..••.........•.......... 
Rates are then fixed to allow the company this final figure. 
$1,200,000 
200,000 
1,000.000 
--~6% 
60,000 
50,000 
$110,000 
8. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 289 (1923) 
(dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J.); BoNRBIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RA.TES 
227 (1961); Rose, Confusion in Valuation for Public Utility Rate-Making, 47 MINN. L. 
REY. 1 (1962); Smith, The Reality of the Public Utility Rate Base, 67 DICK. L. REv. 
83 (1962); Note, 22 MONT. L. REY. 65 (1960). 
The OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION REsEARCH REPORT No. 9 at 1 (1955) 
suggests that accurate and consistent valuation of property and depreciation is nearly 
impossible because of the large volume of work the Commission must handle. Con-
sequently, valuation often approaches guesswork. 
9. 164 Ohio St. 442, 132 N.E.2d 216 (1956). 
10. OHio REY. ConE ANN. § 4909.15 (Page 1954), which reads in part: "[T)he Com-
mission shall, with due regard among other things, to the value of all property of the 
public utility actually used and useful for the convenience of the public, ••• with 
due regard to the necessity of making reservation out of the income for surplus, de• 
predation, and contingencies, and with due regard for all such other matters, as 
are proper • • • fix and determine the just and reasonable rate • • • to be • • • 
charged .••• " 
11. See, e.g., Ohio Edison Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 173 Ohio St. 478, 184 N.E.2d 
70 (1962); Ohio Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 171 Ohio St. IO, 167 N.E.2d 
496 (1960). 
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ment in an existing utility is 500 thousand dollars, composed half of 
debt capital and half of common stock.12 Assume further, however, 
that, due to inflation, the assets purchased with the 500 thousand 
dollars are now valued at one million dollars, the latter figure repre-
senting the assets' reconstruction cost new less depreciation. One 
million dollars, then, is the rate base established under the Ohio 
statute for the actual utility. Next, assume the existence of a hypo-
thetical company which (1) has an investment equal to the actual 
company's statutory rate base, (2) has a debt-equity ratio equal to 
that of the actual company, and (3) pays a historical interest rate on 
its hypothetical debt capital and a rate of return on its hypothetical 
equity capital identical to the rates at which the Commission de-
termines the actual company should pay its real investors. From 
the foregoing data, the overall return required by the hypothetical 
company is calculated. This is accomplished by projecting the debt-
equity ratio of the actual utility onto the amount of the capital 
invested in the hypothetical company. Thus, fifty per cent of the 
hypothetical company's one million dollar capital must provide 
a return to its mythical bondholders and fifty per cent of its 
capital must provide a return to its mythical stockholders. Under 
the City of Cleveland rule, the Commission is required to award the 
actual company the same overall fair return which the Commission 
would be required to allow the hypothetical company in order for 
the latter to be able to pay the return thus calculated to the imagi-
nary bondholders and stockholders who have invested one million 
dollars in the hypothetical company. The amount which the actual 
company needs in order to pay its flesh-and-blood investors a return 
at the same rates on the five hundred thousand dollars, which is in 
fact invested in that company, is immaterial in fixing rates by this 
method. An example of the calculation of the return to which each 
of the companies-actual and hypothetical-is entitled is as follows 
(assuming that the Commission has found the historical interest rate 
on the debt to be four per cent and a reasonable rate of return to the 
stockholders to be ten per cent): 
$500,000 hypothetical debt capital 
X 4% interest rates 
$20,000 for return to bondholders 
$500,000 hypothetical equity capital 
X 10% rate of return on equity 
$50,000 for return to stockholders 
12. That is, assume that half the company's capital has been provided by debt, 
such as by sale of long-term bonds, and half by the issuance of common stock. 
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$20,000 plus $50,000 = $70,000 annual return to company 
= 7 % overall rate of return13 
409 
Of course, since the actual company will pay its real investors an 
overall return of approximately seven per cent on only the five 
hundred thousand dollars actually invested in the company, it need 
pay out only about thirty-five thousand dollars, and, other things 
being equal, the company is free to retain the remaining thirty-five 
thousand dollars which it will receive from consumers. It is in this 
fashion, at least in theory, 14 that the hypothetical company formula 
operates. 
However, the hypothetical company method as set forth in the 
City of Cleveland case has not been restricted to use in computing 
the percentage rate of return. In calculating allowable revenue, 
income tax is includable as an item of expense,15 and interest paid 
on debt is deductible for federal income tax purposes.16 Under the 
hypothetical company concept, the amount deducted for interest 
payments in calculating income· tax requirements is the fictitious 
cost of the debt, regardless of whether it equals the actual amount of 
interest which the company has to pay. Generally, the fictitious 
amount of interest will be greater than the actual amount paid to 
bondholders and other lenders;17 the result is that a sum greater than 
that actually expended is deducted in determining the expense to be 
allowed for the hypothetical federal income tax. Thus, the amount 
of tax which the hypothetical company would pay is smaller than the 
amount which the actual company owes, and the former is the 
amount allowed by the Commission as a tax expense if the hypothet-
ical method is used in all steps of the rate-making process. 
Ill. Or, of course, the overall rate of return to which the company is entitled may 
be calculated directly, as follows (assuming the same figures as have been used in 
the text): 
50% debt ratio 
x 4% interest rate 
~ of rate base must provide for interest on hypothetical debt capital 
50% equity ratio 
x 10% rate of return on equity 
~ of rate base must provide for return on hypothetical equity capital 
2% plus 5% = 7% fair overall rate of return on hypothetical capital 
= 7% fair overall rate of return on actual company's statutory rate 
base 
7% x $1,000,000 hypothetical capital (statutory rate base) = $70,000 overall return 
14. But see dissenting opinion of Judge Gibson in Ohio Fuel Gas v. Public Util. 
Comm'n, 174 Ohio St. 585, 602, 191 N.E.2d 347, 357 (1963), indicating that, in fact, 
the Commission does not apply the hypothetical company theory until after the 
dollar amount of the return has been determined by other methods. 
15, See City of Cincinnati v. Public Util. Comm'n, 153 Ohio St. 56, 90 N.E.2d 681 
(1950). 
16. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 163. 
17. Because of inflation, the reconstruction cost figure will usually be greater than 
the amount of the original investment. 
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Proponents of the hypothetical company method18 contend that 
a hypothetical, rather than actual, tax expense must be used because 
in computing allowable expenses and the rate of return the com-
pany is nearly always allowed more than it will actually have to pay 
for interest on its debt.19 Therefore, in effect, use of the lesser hypo-
thetical income tax allowance helps to balance the gross return 
and to keep the total reasonable. However, it was this step which 
was disapproved by the court in the principal case.20 The hypothet-
ical company method is admittedly complicated and cumbersome, 
but it is an attempt to meet the problem of arriving at a rationally 
evolved rate of return figure in the context of disparity between the 
utility's reconstruction cost and actual investment cost. It affords the 
Commission a tangible basis for computing the percentage rate of 
return by formula; at the same time, when the hypothetical amounts 
are used throughout, it prevents the company from receiving more 
than it needs to acquire a reasonable surplus and pay a reasonable 
return on its capital.21 Moreover, the use of the method throughout 
allows its logic to cut both ways with consistency by reducing the 
gross revenues in times of inflation and increasing them in times of 
depression.22 Thus, the majority opinion disallowed what had 
become a "check" on the RCNLD system without specifically allevi-
ating the need for such a check. Apparently the percentage rate of 
return must still be figured on the basis of an amount of invested 
capital equal to the statutory rate base.23 But in the subsequent 
steps in calculation, such as the figuring of taxes and other expenses, 
only actual figures are to be used. 
The fundamental purpose of rate regulation is the duplication, 
as nearly as possible, of the effect of competition in a naturally 
monopolistic setting.24 Beyond this generally accepted premise, how-
ever, lies one of the most vexing and unsettled areas of the law, a 
situation probably attributable to the fact that no one has yet dis-
18. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taft in the companion case of Ohio 
Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 174 Ohio St. 585, 589, 191 N.E.2d 347, 350 (1963). 
19. On the other hand, if a severe economic recession should cause the reconstruc-
tion-cost figure to fall below the amount originally invested, the company would be 
allowed less for interest than it actually had to pay. In that event, use of the 
hypothetical company concept throughout the rate-making process would allow the 
utility more for income tax expense than it actually owned for taxes and would 
minimize its loss. 
20. Principal case at 578-80, 191 N.E.2d at 343-44. 
21. Mr. Chief Justice Taft did not propose that the company be restricted to an 
amount which is barely enough to pay interest on the debt and a minimum return on 
equity, since such a course might stifle growth. But he did contend that the majority 
opinion would result in allowing the utility much more than a reasonable return, and 
that this construction was contrary to law. 
22. See note 19 supra. 
23. See principal case at 581, 191 N.E.2d at 345; Ohio Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Util. 
Comm'n, 174 Ohio St. 585, 588, 191 N.E.2d 347, 349 (1963). 
24. See BoNBRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 8, at 10-13. 
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covered a satisfactory substitute for actual competitive conditions. 
The fair value principle is only one of the three basic theories fre-
quently used in rate-making, and both the original cost or prudent 
investment theory and the end-result theory also have proponents. 
Under the original cost theory, the public utility is entitled to a 
return based only upon its actual investment, represented by that 
amount of capital prudently put into the business.25 Under the end-
result theory, the concept of a fair return on a rate base is discarded, 
and the regulatory body, in its discretion, simply sets a figure that 
will allow the utility what is considered to be a reasonable profit.26 
Each of these other two theories also has disadvantages. The end-
result theory gives a wide authority to the commission and is seem-
ingly subject to supervision only on the vague ground of abuse of 
discretion. The original cost theory produces a low rate base because, 
if followed without modification, it does not allow for the actual 
increase in value of the original investment due to inflation.27 Never-
theless, use of various versions of the original cost concept seems 
to be in the ascendancy in this country.28 Ohio has, by statute, 
elected to retain a fair value theory of rate-making, thus disregarding 
the trend toward the original cost theory; it has also maintained as 
its sole measure of valuation the RCNLD basis, an approach which, 
under the present-day conditions of continuous inflationary trends, 
may lead to unrealistic results. 
Given Ohio's statutory rate base technique, the approach of the 
court in the principal case did little to clear the air, either in terms 
of the court's rationale or in practical terms of policy. The majority, 
apparently believing the Ohio statute required the Commission to 
allow the utility the amount of income tax it actually had to pay as 
an expense, argued that since the company must pay ll2,017 dollars 
more for income tax than allowed, it would not, in effect, be realiz-
ing a return on the full amount of the rate base.29 Or viewed 
another way, the company would receive only a 5.61 per cent return 
25. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 289 
(1923) (dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J.). 
26. See, e.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
27. See O'Connor, Some Critical Thoughts on Cost of Capital, 62 PUB. UTIL. FoRT. 
93 (1958). But see BoNBRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 8, at 184-86. 
28. See BoNBIUGHT, op. cit. supra note 8, at 232-37. The reconstruction-new method 
of valuation as used in Ohio was first given major impetus in Smyth v. Aymes, 169 U.S. 
466 (1898), decided in a period when the cost to reconstruct the plant was equal to, 
or less than, the actual amount invested in the company. Since then, however, economic 
advancement has almost always caused the investment figure to be considerably less 
than the cost of reconstruction. Although reconstruction-cost remains a part of some 
state proceedings, the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the theory's 
weakness in valuation and disavowed the fair value method as necessary in rate-making. 
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
29. Judge O'Neill reasoned that, since the Commission found the company en-
titled to a rate of return of 5.8% on a rate base of $59,827,440, it should be allowed 
a dollar return of $3,469,922. But, under the Commission's order, the company would 
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on the rate base, rather than the 5.8 per cent which the Commission 
had set as the reasonable rate of return. What the majority failed to 
state (or, perhaps, to realize) was that the 5.8 per cent figure was 
itself a reasonable rate of return only with reference to a uniform 
hypothetical company formula. While the 5.8 per cent figure was a 
fair return rate for the hypothetical company, it was not necessarily 
fair for General Telephone Company.30 
The decision in the principal case will permit Ohio utilities a 
greater gross annual return on the rate base than has been given 
them since the City of Cleveland case.31 The Court has opened the 
door to the potential practical evil of the RCNLD method-allow-
ing more to the utility than is reasonably needed-with a conse-
quent increase of the ratepayers' burden. Moreover, this about-face 
by the Court is likely to hamper seriously the fundamental reasons 
for having a regulatory agency rather than the courts set rates. 
Not only must the Commission adjust its present procedure of com-
puting rates, but, more importantly, it must remain ready for possible 
additional judicial changes in the rate-making process if the present 
approach proves unsound or is itself misconstrued by the courts.82 
The hypothetical company principle was originally used to ration-
alize the RCNLD method of computing a rate base. Since uniform 
application of the hypothetical company principle had been em-
ployed as a check on utility revenues, the breakdown in its consistent 
use throughout the rate-making process may cause a rash of "too 
high" returns, thus forcing the Commission to search for another 
control to serve the same purpose as that rejected by the Court in the 
principal case. If it becomes apparent that the decision is producing 
unreasonable, and therefore unsatisfactory, results, the Commission 
has available at least three other computational controls to replace 
the check on utility revenues that the Court condemned. It could 
(1) consider only the interest the company actually has to pay on its 
debt when figuring the percentage rate of return, or (2) set a rate of 
return that in its opinion appears reasonable in light of current 
economic conditions and evidence of the company's financial status, 
or (3) cut the allowance for equity return to a lower figure. Probably 
have to divert $112,017 to pay for income tax that it was not being allowed as an 
expense. Therefore, the company's effective rate base was only $57,896,121. 
30. The Commission was aware that the hypothetical tax would reduce the effec-
tive rate of return. If it had intended the company to realize an actual rate of return 
of 5,8%, it could have adjusted its computations to allow a higher rate, perhaps 
above 6%, to ,the hypothetical company. 
31. This is assuming, of course, that the reconstruction cost remains higher than 
the amount of original investment in the companies. The converse is not likely. See 
dissenting opinion of Judge Gibson in Ohio Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 
174 Ohio St. 585, 603, 191 N.E.2d 347, 358 (1963). 
32. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taft in Ohio Fuel Gas Co. T, 
Public Util. Comm'n, 174 Ohio St. 585, 589, 191 N.E.2d 347, 350 (1963). 
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none of these would be acceptable to the company involved. Reduc-
ing the interest allowance to the actual cost of the debt would prob-
ably result in a smaller return to the utility than was realized under 
the hypothetical company concept. Moreover, in Ohio Fuel Gas Co. 
v. Public Util. Comm'n,83 the court expressly held that reduction of 
interest allowance to actual cost was contrary to Ohio law. Nor does 
the second alternative seem feasible. Although Judge Gibson, a 
former member of the Commission, suggested in his dissent that the 
Ohio Commission in fact does set a rate of return which appears 
reasonable to it,84 the agency has outwardly adhered to formula in 
determining the rate of return. If it should now attempt to espouse 
what amounts to the end-result theory, it will surely be met with 
vigorous charges of abuse of discretion if a lower return is ordered. 
Finally, reducing the equity return allowance may cause the utility 
to lose potential investors to non-regulated industries at the time of 
a new stock issue and thus provide the utility with further ground 
for complaint. 
Perhaps the decision in the principal case is most important in a 
pedagogical sense. It should serve to alert the state legislature to the 
fact that the courts are not satisfactorily equipped to deal with 
changes in conditions and circumstances in the public utilities 
field.85 The Ohio General Assembly owes the utilities and the rate-
payers the duty to investigate and appraise thoroughly-either by 
itself or through the Commission-the fair value theory of rate-
making and the RCNLD method of valuation to determine whether 
they are properly serving their intended purpose of effective public 
utility regulation. If they are not, the methods should be modified 
or even completely discarded in favor of some form of original cost 
or end-result concept.86 
3!1. 171 Ohio St. JO, 167 N.E.2d 496 (1960). 
34. See note 14 supra. 
35. For a critism of the Ohio court's role in the rate-making process, see dis-
senting opinion of Judge Gibson in Ohio Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 174 
Ohio St. 585, 601, 191 N.E.2d 347, 357 (1963); Note, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 314 (1964). 
36. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text. 
